Friday, 20 November, 2026

Mental presencing distinct from deconcealment

The following excerpt is the revised section 2.10 of my On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo.

The mind’s shifting its focus to an essencing situation in one of the three temporal dimensions, within a nimbus of threefold presencing ‘all at once’ from all three temporal dimensions in the course of some practice or other, lets it come to mental presence. Here, for convenience, the discussion is restricted to a single-minded focusing of the mind’s attention on just one of the three temporal dimensions without, however, restricting the validity of the observations to be made.

For any factual situation in one of the three temporal dimensions to ‘be’ at all, it must i) essence in the shared psychic temporal openness which, in turn, ii) enables its being understood as such-and-such by an individual mind (or some individual minds) presencing the situation in its focus. It essences, first of all, by potentially presencing for and absencing from mind in the all-encompassing openness of three-dimensional time. Actual mental presencing for the understanding mind enables any situation to be understood in some way or other, including being misunderstood. Such interpretive misunderstanding is attributable first of all, in an elementary case, to the situation itself partially concealing itself or rather, conversely, deconcealing itself only partially or distortedly to the mind. The situation itself may also deconceal itself as what it is not, i.e. deceptively. There may be no difficulty in recalling a situation from memory i.e. in represencing it from mental absence, but the recalled situation must also be understood, i.e. interpreted, one way or another, and this understanding itself may be deficient, distorted, incomplete, entirely deceptive which amounts to partial concealing or deceptive deconcealing. Although represenced, the situation is only deficiently deconcealed; mental presencing and deconcealing thus do not coincide. Note that here we are considering only factual situations, and not the underlying hermeneutic cast of mind in a given age, such as our own, which is generally taken for granted and remains invisible.

In traditional discussions, that are generally fixated upon factual sensuous presencing, preference is given to sensuously present situations toward which the mind can intentionally direct its bodily sense organs, especially its visual ones, that is, the eyes. The sensuously present situation is potentially present for the mind — if only it would turn its sense-perceptual attention toward it. In so doing, the situation is sensuously presenced from absence and thus, through this presencing, is revealed, or deconcealed (entborgen), to the mind more or less fully and clearly through the senses, that is, as long as the senses themselves are not deceived.

It must be underscored that both concealment and deconcealment presuppose presencing for the mind or absencing from it. In other words, presencing and absencing in the all-encompassing openness of three-dimensional time are more originary phenomena than concealing and deconcealing, both of which depend upon and are essential features of more originary mental presencing and absencing. As we have seen above (cf. 2.5 Temporally threefold mental presencing), temporally three-dimensional presencing ‘all at once’ comes into its own especially when considering action, practice, making and physical movement, or any other kind of movement, i.e. existential movement necessarily involving presencing and absencing. Hence the movement of concealing and deconcealing for the individual mind is itself embedded, as it must be, in the more originary movement of mental presencing and absencing in three-dimensional temporality itself. In particular, absencing is the phenomenon of essencing (temporally and temporarily) out of the mind’s (temporally fourth-dimensional) presencing purely and simply. The mind is distracted, has turned its attention away or has lost its attentiveness. That is to say, all that mentally absences (essents, situations) is temporally absent in three-dimensional time from the fourth temporal dimension and, insofar as it can potentially (δυνάμει) presence, is only temporarily absent, and from this absence it may presence in the psyche’s interpretive mind and be deconcealed more or less undistortedly, with such distortions and defects amounting to concealment of the factual situation in itself. Otherwise, for a given individual, it may even be unable to presence clearly in the mind at all.

The bodily senses have a perceptual power (δύναμις) to sense and perceive a physically local situation presented to them (whilst not of themselves making sense of, i.e. understanding it as such-and-such). (The locally presented situation may rely on more or less sophisticated technological means of communication from remote places to ‘localize’ it.) Thus the bodily senses are activated (ἐνέργεια) in an act of perception, whereby the sensuously present situation is indeed deconcealed, but only to the extent that it reveals itself undistortedly and undeceptively to the senses. Insofar, sensuous presencing and deconcealing go together, but mixed with partial concealing or false deconcealing. Hence, for example,(fn23) a figure standing in a field can present itself to the sensuously observing eyes and mind from afar as (interpretable — incorrectly — as) a human individual, whereas closer up it turns out to be (interpretable — correctly — as) a scarecrow. The initial sensuous perception turns out to be false (i.e. a false factual interpretation) and is corrected by a view closer up, in better light, that reveals more to the sense of sight. The perceptual error in this case can reasonably be attributed to a lack of sensory power of the bodily sense organ, the eye, its perceptual capacity. From afar, certain details of a situation simply cannot be sensuously perceived by eyesight in the given illumination, thus leading to the false factual interpretation. In another situation, however, it may be the situation itself that does not fully deconceal itself, as in the case where the buildings in an urban environment wholly obscure the view of the mountain behind, as if the mountain were not there at all, or where a cupboard is positioned on a wall, thus entirely concealing the unused door behind, as if the door were not there at all.(fn24) The door is physically, locally present to the observer, but concealed from the observer’s mind that is deceived by appearances. (For the person who moved the cupboard to hide the door, it is not concealed at all, but recallable to mind from memory.) In such cases, it is a deficiency of the sensuously perceptible situation itself that prevents a factually correct sense perception due to the situation itself only partially deconcealing itself to the senses or presenting itself falsely as something else. Local presence and mental concealment here go together. Note that deconcealment is so far being discussed only in the sense of correctness, i.e. in the factual situation’s being correctly, rather than falsely, deconcealed as such-and-such. Its truth is a different, deeper matter that will be discussed later (cf. 6 Temporalogical recasting in historical time).

Deconcealing is not solely a feature of sense perception in the present, but pertains to presencing from all three temporal dimensions, and that not only of physical situations. In calling to mind an as yet absent future situation such as the signing of a contract of purchase, an experienced solicitor may have in view all the necessary conditions and the proper formulation of clauses without omitting any detail that would leave a legal loophole open for the other party. The mentally presenced, as yet absent future situation of signing is thus fully deconcealed with regard to all the necessary legal precautions, but not with regard to other details that may well remain concealed because they have no bearing on the contractual transaction (such as where the signing is to take place). The deconcealment of the as yet absent future contractual situation to the solicitor’s presencing mind is independent of whether the envisaged purchase ever actually (ἐνεργείᾳ) comes about, i.e. whether the expectation of an executed purchase is disappointed and never presences in the present. The solicitor’s past experience has already revealed (or deconcealed) to him all the pertinent details that can be carried over to the envisaged futurally absent signing of the purchase contract, whereas a young and inexperienced solicitor may omit certain important clauses safeguarding the prospective purchaser’s interests. In such a case, the absent future envisaged situation is present to mind but only imperfectly deconcealed, again independently of whether the envisaged purchase ever comes about, i.e. presences in the present. The deconcealment, imperfect or otherwise, has to be distinguished from a correct, foresighted prediction, e.g. that, given the circumstances, the signing will actually take place. Deconcealment here must therefore not be confused with any notion of ‘predictively seeing into the future’.

Agreements such as contracts and treaties represent the attempt to deconceal and bring possible absent future movements, i.e. contingencies, under control through a binding agreement among parties giving their word, thus constituting a kind of bond. Their word is a pro-mise (Latin promissum) that is ‘sent on ahead’ to bindingly control the foreseen contingencies of possible future situations that are as yet absent and may never presence in the present (as in insurance contracts), but presence for the foreseeing mind. The contract or treaty, however, must deconceal and properly articulate in language future eventualities. The various contingencies, firstly, must be mentally deconcealed in order to be taken account of in the binding word of a contract or treaty and, secondly, the parties to the agreement must accept the obligation to be bound by their promised word by giving their word. The mind’s envisaging a future situation amounts to its imagining through the fourth temporal dimension events, situations, eventualities, etc. in the temporal dimension of the future.

With regard to the deconcealment of a now absent past situation that presupposes its presencing for the mind, this is usually called remembering or recalling from memory. The mind shifts its present focus by turning its attention to that now irretrievably absent past situation presently out of mind, and entering into that temporal dimension to ‘be’, i.e. to presence mentally, the situation itself, and not some representation or replication of it somewhere ‘inside’ the mind or even the cerebrum. You may recall (mentally presence), for instance, having spent a few days in a hotel in a certain city one summer and remember (deconceal) many of the details such as its location in the city, its surroundings, the look of the room and the breakfast room, the friendliness of the staff, etc. but altogether fail to recall the hotel’s name. By remembering, you are presencing the hotel in that past situation through the fourth temporal dimension from the now absent past and are there with the hotel itself in that city that past summer, but the recalling-presencing leaves a detail, i.e. the hotel’s name, concealed, forgotten. This example illustrates that such attentive presencing-with may reveal many of the details of a past situation, including the gist of its most important features, but it may also fail to deconceal important features or even mistakenly recall details that never occurred or occurred (essenced) on some quite different occasion. Such mistaken recalling, or imaginative inventiveness, may be motivated by present concerns to make an absent past situation congruent with a different present one (such as telling a good yarn in company) that likewise has to deconceal itself when the mind presences it, perhaps in a deficient or distorted way that amounts to the mind’s misunderstanding it or leaving decisive details concealed.

Deficiencies in deconcealment thus abound in every factual (i.e. ontic) situation that presences for the mind from the temporal present or the other two temporal dimensions. Conversely, there are essencing situations presencing from all three temporal dimensions that are potentially factually deconcealed, but the distracted mind fails to presence them by turning its attention, or having its attention drawn, toward them; they remain thus absent from the mind. In that case, the individual’s existential movement has something else in mind from three-dimensional temporality. Situations in any of the three temporal dimensions of past, present or future, may be either present to or absent from mind. In this sense, paradoxially, the present may be absent or the past or future present. It is therefore risky to speak of the past or the future as temporal dimensions of absence, at least with regard to presencing (Vergegenwärtigung) for the mind. It must be underscored that speaking of an as yet absent, not yet present future situation or a now absent, no longer present situation invokes an entirely different sense of presence and absence than that pertinent to presencing for and absencing from the psychic mind in the fourth temporal dimension. In other words, the temporal dimensions of past and future are dimensions of temporal absence only with respect to the temporal dimension of the present, and not with respect to the fourth temporal dimension of the psyche endowed with its interpretive mind.

Further reading: On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo (OHT) De Gruyter, Berlin 2024.

(fn23) Cf. Plato’s similar example in Philebos.

(fn24) Cf. Heidegger Parmenides GA54:47.

Thursday, 12 November, 2026

Confusing concealment with absence and deconcealment with presence (Heidegger)

The following excerpt is the revised section 2.10.1 of my On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo.

Even though Heidegger’s great achievement remains his uncovering of the meaning of being as originary, three-dimensional time during the course of his wide-ranging work in the 1920s, culminating in Sein und Zeit, after the failure of this work, before 1930, there is a turn, or rather pivot, in his thinking toward bringing disclosive, or deconcealing, truth (ἀλήθεια) into the foreground at the cost of tacitly relegating the three-dimensional temporal openness to a lesser, or even superseded status. This is apparent already in his WS 1928/29 Freiburg lectures(fn25), and is made explicit when Heidegger writes repeatedly over the years, ”The name ‘time’ in the title mentioned [Being and Time], according to the clearly expressed belonging to being, is the provisional name for the more originary essencing of ἀλήθεια.” (Der Name ‘Zeit’ ist in dem gemeinten Titel [Sein und Zeit] gemäß der klar ausgesprochenen Zugehörigkeit zum Sein der Vorname für das ursprünglichere Wesen der ἀλήθεια. GA54:113(fn26)) The clearing (Lichtung) is already assigned in Sein und Zeit to the question of truth, without exploring its implications, or interweavings, with originary time as openness for the world. This leads Heidegger, in part, to even equate concealment with absence, e.g. in his WS 1933/1934 lectures: ”…out of the absence and concealment hitherto [prevailing] into the repre-sentedness [to the mind]…” (…aus der bisherigen Abwesenheit und Verborgenheit in die Vor-gestelltheit… GA36/37:117) and ”Being signifies for the Greeks to be present, not absent, not hidden…” (Sein bedeutet für die Griechen anwesend sein, nicht abwesend, nicht verborgen… GA36/37:229).

Nowhere does Heidegger painstakingly and unmistakably clarify the distinction and criss-crossed interplay between concealment, deconcealment, absence, presence, which is not surprising, given that ἀλήθεια is deployed as the substitute concept for ‘time’. Nor does he clarify the fourth temporal dimension first introduced — or rather, popping up briefly in a ‘guest appearance’ — in his late 1962 talk ‘Zeit und Sein’ as the temporal dimension through which essents essence for the understanding mind from all three remaining temporal dimensions, namely, past, present and future. The talk itself is rather an anomaly, for it marks a brief return to the question of originary time after decades of neglect. Rather, on the contrary, he thoroughly confuses and conflates concealment, absence, deconcealment and presence, thereby displaying conceptual carelessness or confusion for the sake of foregrounding ἀλήθεια. Such carelessness is discernible, of course, only for conceptual thinking, and not for scholarly diligence’s comparing of quotes.

The roots of this confusion or rather, this failure to make headway, are apparent already in GA24, the volume with the SS 1927 Marburg lectures delivered in the year when Sein und Zeit (SuZ) was published. It contains, notably, the only published attempt by Heidegger to present the third and final part of SuZ. Here the reader can witness Heidegger floundering in trying to make a distinction between existential Zeitlichkeit and the more outlying Temporalität, starting from the phenomenon of Dasein’s existential understanding of the at-handness of Zeug (equipment) by introducing a distinction between the transcendental horizons of Gegenwart and Praesenz, i.e. the difference between phenomena designated by the Germanic and Latin words for English ‘presence’. He makes no headway, and it is no wonder that he abandons the attempt to complete Sein und Zeit, thus making room for his thinking to subsequently pivot to the question of ἀλήθεια, in particular, in the 1930 talk ‘Vom Wesen der Wahrheit’ as well as in the GA27 WS 1928/29, GA34 WS 1931/32 and GA36/37 WS 1933/34 lectures, all of which engage with the question of Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (on the essencing of truth).

At times he does underscore and show phenomenologically (e.g. by adducing the factual case of a stolen bicycle) that (local) absence itself is compatible with a presencing in the mind as the locally absent bicycle, and thus a mode of being (i.e. of essencing) in its own right, and even that this mental presencing from local absence is deconcealing. E.g. when you lose your car keys and discover the loss, the physically, locally absent car keys are very present to your mind, and also deconcealed correctly (to your mind) despite — or rather, precisely in — their local absence from your pocket (they are missing, somewhere else), even though you do not know (concealed to your presencing mind) where they are at present (their precise location is concealed). In this example, absence from place in the present (you can sensuously feel in your pocket that they are not there) and focused presence to mind go together. Local absence as mental presence! It is, however, crucial in each case to clearly distinguish between non-being (ontologically), absence (temporalogically) and concealment in the mind, in the physical world (locally) and in the social world, i.e. to have them firmly distinct in mental view.

In short, Heidegger surrenders and buries his discovery of the temporal meaning of being by shifting his focus to and foregrounding the phenomenon of ἀλήθεια, i.e. truth as deconcealment. This shiftiness in position begins already in Sein und Zeit (1927) with the long section on Wahrheit (truth § 44), the final section before the start of the second part of SuZ on “Dasein und Zeitlichkeit” (lit. ‘timeliness’) that amounts to a deeper grounding, through conceptual repetition, of the Sorge (care) structure (which is the culmination of SuZ’s first part) in ecstatic time. This positioning already indicates equivocation and tendentially cuts off the phenomen of truth from its temporal roots.

Years later, in What Calls to Thinking? (Was heißt Denken? 1951/52), he even incoherently gives precedence to deconcealing over presencing when he writes, “What is presencing has emerged from deconcealment.”(fn27), rather than absence, as if all presencing were a deconcealing and as if pure presencing required a deeper-lying, more originary deconcealedness already beforehand to enable the presencing of something. Already Aristotle distinguishes various meanings of being (or, more precisely, of the beingness of beings) including that of οὐσία (essence, quidditas, whatness) as well as ἀλήθεια conceived as the truth/falsity of propositions (λόγοι) about (κατά) beings. Heidegger shows that the truth of a being does not reside originarily in a proposition about it, but in the being itself, e.g. true gold is a mode of being/presencing of gold in its deconcealed truth, rather than a false deconcealing as false gold. False gold, however, presents itself, i.e. presences, albeit distortedly, deceptively as if it were true gold. Its falsity depends upon its sensuous presencing as…. Truth is thus a characteristic of essents themselves presencing for the mind as such-and-such rather than a quality of propositions which, as it turns out, can at most be correct, but not true in the sense of a deconcealment of their phenomenal mode of essencing. A correct proposition only corresponds, or is adequate to (adequatio) the deconcealment of the factual (temporal) phenomenon in question itself. The truth of phenomena delves deeper (than their facticity) into their historical hermeneutic casting by a hermeneutic As, i.e. it concerns how the world in a given age is interpreted.

Throughout his entire career as a thinker Heidegger does not square his uncovering of the temporal nature of being itself with his investigation of ἀλήθεια as disclosure (Unverborgenheit, deconcealment, revealment). Further evidence of his confusion and equivocation are his lectures and writings on Nietzsche, where we read repeatedly the formulation of the implicit meaning of being (or rather beingness, οὐσία, essencing, presencing) for the Greeks, ”presencing of the steadfast into the deconcealed” (Anwesenheit des Beständigen in das Unverborgene NII:217, the ‘into’ rather than ‘in’ is required to translate the accusative case of ‘in das’). The steadfast here are the ideas themselves, the persistently present ontological ‘looks’ of beings as beings in which they stand for the mind’s understanding when coming to mental presence, thus deconcealing themselves as such-and-such to the mind. The steadfast looks of beings are what make up the ontological cast or scaffolding of an age that is deconcealed to the mind of that age, i.e. its Zeit-Geist. Reformulated temporalogically: the hermeneutic cast of an age consists of the scaffolding of interconnected, steadfast εἴδη or eidetic ‘looks’ of the essents essencing in three-dimensional time for the mind that enable the essents to be understood as such-and-such. As ‘always already’ cast in a given age, they essence, via the fourth temporal dimension, for the mind from the past (to be discussed in more detail below; cf. 6 Temporalogical recasting in historical time).

Further reading: On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo (OHT) De Gruyter, Berlin 2024.

(fn25) Martin Heidegger Einleitung in die Philosophie (GA27) Otto Saame & Ina Saame-Speidel (eds.), Klostermann, Frankfurt 1996.

(fn26) GA54 contains the WS 1942/43 lectures on Parmenides centred on the interpretation of ἀλήθεια. The purported “clearly expressed belonging [of time] to being” is back to front, for it is, in truth, being in the sense of presence (Anwesenheit) that belongs to time. Cf. also e.g. Zur Sache des Denkens, “The name ‘time’ is the provisional name for what was later called ‘the truth of being’.” (Der Name ‘Zeit’ ist der Vorname für das, was später ‘die Wahrheit des Seins’ hieß. SD:30).

(fn27) “Das Anwesende ist aus der Unverborgenheit aufgegangen.” GA08:240.

Wednesday, 11 November, 2026

The ecstatic Now

The starting-point for a temporalogical recasting of the mind, which amounts to an alternative reinterpretation of the historical world in another age (our own), is the concept of three-dimensional time. It is all-encompassing, all-comprehending for us mortals, even to the extent that our “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger) is more originarily grounded in our essencing in three-dimensional time. However, there is an equivocation here in that three-dimensional time has to be complemented by a fourth temporal dimension to accommodate explicitly our mortal belonging to three-dimensional time. For it is through the fourth dimension that three-dimensional time, and all that essences in its three dimensions, is passed through in a unified way to the mortal psyche. It is then the psyche’s mental faculty that interprets all that comes to presence for the mind. The ecstatic Now enables the mind to ’see’ (perceive) in three dimensions ‘all at once’, endowing it with what I call temporally threefold perception, which is the condition of possibility for the mind’s ’seeing’ movement as such at all.

This coming-to-presence in the psyche for the mind’s interpretation is captured by the German word ‘Vergegenwärtigung’ with the corresponding verb ‘vergegenwärtigen’, standardly translated as ‘to call to mind’, a translation suggesting an activity of the mind. A more neutral, or passive, translation would be ‘to come to mind’ or ‘to occur to mind’. In my OHT I term this the mind’s focusing on essents presencing from any of the three temporal dimensions. Such a focusing of the mind occurs in the present (hence the ‘Gegenwart’ in vergegenwärtigen), but not, paradoxically, in the temporal dimension of the present (Gegenwart). It occurs in the fourth temporal dimension, which may be called the ‘ecstatic Now’; ‘ecstatic’ because it signifies the fourth temporal dimension’s ’standing out’ into the other three temporal dimension, receptive for all that is passed through to it for the mind’s (always interpretive, hermeneutic) understanding.

Essents presencing for the mind’s interpretation are interpreted not just factually as certain facts (e.g. that car over there is dark blue in colour, which may be correct or incorrect), but more originarily also from an historical hermeneutic cast of mind maintaining its stability throughout a given historical age. Hence, in the medieval age, the human being was cast as an ens creatum created by almighty God, whereas in the modern age, this interpretation of the human being shifted to cast it as a subject underlying everything and therefore endowed with knowledge (ideally) to master all movement in the world. In our present cast of world it seems impossible to conceive the human being as anything other than a subject endowed with consciousness — a Cartesian legacy.

The three-dimensionally ecstatic Now must not be confused with the Now or instant of linear, one-dimensional time. The latter is like a bead on a string called the time-line that slips continuously from the future through the present moment, where it ‘lights up’ as ‘existing’, into the past, when it ‘no longer exists’. The conception of time as a continuous succession of instants remains dominant in today’s cast of mind, where it does its service, in particular, as a real variable in equations to measure the so-called ‘passage of time’ for mathematized physics. Even modifications of this conception of a time-line as, say, in general relativity or discretized in loop quantum gravity (Carlo Rovelli) remain tied to a notion of succession. All these conceptions of time miss the phenomenon of originary time itself by spatializing it. They continue the tradition of linear time first laid out in Aristotle’s Physics in which time was cast as derivative of physical movement. Even today, philosophers and scientists ‘argue’ that the arrow of time is irreversible owing to the second law of thermodynamics! This stupidity is passed on generation for generation through the universities.

Further reading: On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo (OHT) De Gruyter, Berlin 2024.

Friday, 30 October, 2026

Plato on the art of money-making — and what ensued

In the dialogue between Socrates and Polos in Gorgias at 477e, Plato presents an innocuous, if not to say naive, view of money-making:

Σωκράτης: τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική;
Πῶλος: ναί.

“Socrates: Now what is the art that sets free from poverty? Is it not money-making?
Polos: Yes.”

The very art, or technique, whose usefulness is said is to reside in setting free from poverty, also induces it for, as it turns out, this art is the germ of what will become a couple of millennia later full-blown capitalism. There are today countless apologists for capitalism who point out that capitalism has raised millions and millions out of poverty, with poverty being measured by how many dollars an individual has to spend daily, e.g. one, or even two, dollars a day. Not a word about how capitalism, through its essential striving for surplus-value, simultaneously destroys the way of life of a people. With this destruction, especially of the environment, people have no choice but to seek to earn an income some other way. This may result in their entering the fray of competition for urban jobs. Indigenous peoples lose their roots in an old culture that goes under in the modern, market-mediated way of capitalist life.

Capitalism started out very modestly as τέχνη χρηματιστική, the art of money-making. It manifested itself above all in commerce and trade. Commerce is the coming-together of goods on the market, where they can be and are exchanged. In doing so, they are mutually estimated, valued for what they are worth as exchange-value. Usually this is done through the medium of money, in which they are quantitatively valued. As medium of exchange, money is merely a serviceable means to an end, namely, exchange. The mediation of exchange is thus listed as one of the functions of money. This seems reasonable enough.

The art of money-making had to take over the production process of goods to transform itself into genuine capitalism, that is premised upon money-capital buying the means of production and hiring labour power to employ them producing goods. This extension and transformation of money-making into mature capitalism took millennia. Greek thinking did not have this development in its sights. For the Greeks, τέχνη χρηματιστική was just one τέχνη alongside other τέχναι including, notably, τέχνη ποιητική. The art of making useful things existed alongside the art of making money, but it was the former that played an essential role in Greek thinking, serving as it did as the paradigm for investigating the ontology of movement.

The question of movement was at the core of Greek philosophical thinking when it arose in the sixth century B.C.E. It focused on the investigation of κινούμενα, things that can be moved, physical things, which is the subject matter of physics. Aristotle’s Physics is itself at the heart of his metaphysics, but he does not take the natural movement, say, of celestial bodies, as the paradigm for physical movement. Instead he investigates the movement of making things, i.e. τέχνη ποιητική, to fashion the key concepts of his ontology of (productive) movement which then, fatefully, has been transferred to other kinds of movement for which it is ill-suited, thus obscuring the truth of the pertinent phenomena..

Another paradigm residing in τέχνη χρηματιστική was available for an alternative ontology of another kind of movement, viz. interchange, but this was left to one side by Greek thinking. Seriously taking up and unfolding this alternative leads to an alternative interpretation of the world by an alternative cast of mind. So far in Western thinking, this opportunity has been missed and dismissed. Be that as it may, without Aristotle’s ontology of productive movement, the crucial importance of energy (ἐνέργεια) would not figure in today’s world. The unbridled will to power over productive movement would by hindered. It would lack an indispensable concept. The so-called March of Progress would be held up.

The interweaving and intermeshing of productive movement with the exchange movement on the various exchanges and markets of global capitalism characterize what we today call capitalism. An ontology of exchange and interchange, however, has so far been lacking. Among other things, it would allow the intermeshing of the two kinds of movement to be suitably conceptualized. I have attempted to fill this lacuna with an ontology of exchange that serves not only as key to conceptualizing capitalism, but also as the basis for a social ontology of how we sociate with each other in society through mutual estimation of who we are. Such a power play of whoness requires concepts entirely different from those required for an ontology of productive, efficient causal movement at the heart of all the modern sciences. Unfortunately, the modern mind is currently not up to thinking ontologically, and will be out of action for another time to come.

Neither Plato nor Aristotle had, nor could have had, something resembling capitalism in view or in mind. In this sense, they remained necessarily naive. Nevertheless, the two paradigms of productive movement (τέχνη ποιητική) and gainful movement (τέχνη χρηματιστική) slumbered in the Greek world. Especially the latter has clandestinely sprung to life in our own, attaining an eery, destructive independence from any human intentions in the valorization of thingified value. The former does show its face, albeit obscurely, in the guise of the thoroughly empiricist modern sciences. Yet humans kid themselves that everything is still under control, viz. under the control of us humans as subjects.

Further reading: Plato Gorgias. Greek: https://el.wikisource.org/wiki/Γοργίας_(Πλάτων)

Social Ontology of Whoness: Rethinking core phenomena of political philosophy De Gruyter, Berlin 2019.

‘Technology, Technique, Interplay: Questioning Die Frage nach der Technik’ in Technology and Society Magazine IEEE Issue 2, Summer 2013 pp. 13-21.

Wednesday, 28 October, 2026

Hegel’s dictum “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”

One of the most famous and oft-cited of Hegel’s pronouncements comes from the Preface to his Philosophy of Right (Rechtsphilosophie 1821, 3rd ed. 1830), translated into English by T.M. Knox as “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational” for the German: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; and was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.” (RPh. Werke 7 S.24). Hegel’s dictum is pronounced authoritatively, but it is not a dogmatic assertion. Rather it is a concentrated distillation of his entire system whose origins can be followed up. The English translation is problematic, relying as it does on Latin filtered through French, and, even remaining within German, the interpretation of this pithy pronouncement remains controversial. I will cut to the chase by concentrating upon the interpretation of “actual”/”wirklich” and especially “rational”/”vernünftig”, both of which originate in Greek thinking, and I will not stick to interpreting only Hegel.

‘Actuality’ for the Greeks, i.e. Aristotle, is ἐνέργεια (_energeia_), i.e. the at-work-ness of a power (δύναμις _dynamis_) in productive movement toward an end (_telos_ τέλος). This movement can be understood, in particular, as a process of becoming (Werden) and so not necessarily as an existing, attained state of affairs. ‘Actus’ in Latin signifies correspondingly an ‘act’ as the action of a power (potentia) at work toward some final goal. ‘Wirklichkeit’ and ‘wirklich’ in German signify similarly the dynamic action of a power at work rather than a static, realized state of affairs, i.e. what we today call ‘reality’. In today’s German, ‘Wirklichkeit’ equates pretty much with ‘reality’ which, in turn, is derivative of Latin ‘res’ (thing, matter). Hence e.g. a republic (res publica) is a form of government concerned with public matters, whereas a res extensa is a physical thing.

German ‘Vernunft’ is a standard translation of Latin ‘ratio’, which in turn is a rendering of Greek λόγος (_logos_) or νοῦς (_nous_), hence ‘mind’. ‘Mind’, in turn, is ‘Geist’ in German, one of the key, load-bearing concepts in Hegel’s thinking as a whole. It figures in Hegel’s first major work from 1807, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, a title misleadingly rendered these days in English as Phenomenology of Spirit, rather than, more adequately, as Phenomenology of Mind. For Hegel, it is Geist/mind that comes to actuality in the world, step by step, in the movement of world history (Weltgeschichte), culminating in Hegel’s philosophy of “absoluter Geist” (absolute mind) that simultaneously brings the history of metaphysical thinking to a close.

To be brief, my interpretive translation of Hegel’s pronouncement reads: “What is actively at work in the world corresponds to an historical hermeneutic cast of mind”. This interpretation, of course, does violence to Hegel’s understanding of his own system and especially his philosophy of history conceived as a progress of mind realizing (actualizing) itself in the world. Pace Hegel, the final, actual, historical world cannot be conceived as the actuality of the Christian god as known through absolute mind, with the positive connotations of such an actualization. What is actualized in the world is certainly an historical cast of mind, for the world ‘is’ or ‘essences’ only for the mind, and that in an interpretation of its phenomenality, especially its key, elementary phenomena, starting with being itself, time, movement. All three phenomena are subjected to rigorous interrogation and reinterpretation by the major philosophers throughout Western history, who therefore figure as historically situated co-casters of world. They are not necessarily welcomed by their contemporaries.

In particular, two philosophers stand out whose interpretation of the historical world can be regarded as dystopian: Heidegger and Marx. Both are deeply indebted to Aristotle. It is not only worthwhile, but crucial and pivotal to engage critically with these two thinkers if today’s world is to be interpreted at all adequately. In earlier work I confronted these two thinkers with one another (Capital and Technology: Marx and Heidegger, published also in German and Chinese). Each pin-points how we have come to this historical pass in a cast of world=cast of mind that is anything but the achievement of reaching a final historical ‘fair’, rather than ugly, destination.

For Heidegger, the seeds for an absolute will to power over all kinds of movement (as I reformulate Heidegger) were sown already with Aristotle’s ontology of productive movement, which is why he characterizes Aristotle’s Physics as the “Grundbuch” (foundational book) of Western thinking. These have flourished into what he calls the Ge-Stell, which I call the set-up. The Ge-Stell can be regarded as Heidegger’s final diagnosis and verdict over what was set in train with the “first beginning” in metaphysical Greek thinking, whose ontological branch focused on investigating, i.e. on bringing to conceptual light, ‘the being as being’ (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν). The set-up represents the culmination of the absolute will to power over all kinds of movement in endless technological progress, which all the modern sciences serve in one way or another. Especially the late Heidegger proposes the alternative of “another beginning”.

Marx, whose philosophical thinking Heidegger more or less completely neglected, to his own detriment, presents with his enormous, unfinished three-tome Das Kapital, what I have come to interpret as a social ontology of capitalism along with a critique of the capitalist cast of mind that covers up and suppresses in multiple ways the truth of this historical mode of economic life. This cast of mind is actualized in what I call the gainful game (Gewinnst) played atop the underlying essential movement of endless valorization of thingified value. Such valorization is the hidden global law (or principle) of movement governing today’s global capitalist economy behind the backs of the players in the gainful game.

Today we are all such players, rather than “Angestellte des Ge-Stells” (Heidegger). As players we may be winners or losers in the game, more or less satisfied with our lot, at least in the ‘developed’ West. Losers are legion. The principle of valorizing movement itself, however, is pernicious and indifferent to life, for it is posited on the exploitation of both human labour power and the Earth. Thingified value valorizes by generating surplus value whose magnitude is only diminished by what is paid to employees in wages and to landowners as ground-rent. Nature as such is defenceless. All movement is a contradiction, but the movement of valorization is a pernicious contradiction harmful to both mortals and the Earth, albeit that participation in this movement on the surface may even appear delusively as the “pursuit of happiness” in the necessarily competitive, combative gainful game.

There is therefore an endless struggle between functioning capital and labour power as well as devastating exploitation of the Earth that has become increasingly visible today after centuries of capitalism. The endless principle of valorizing thingified value is both pernicious and ruthless. Humans hiring out their labour power to valorizing capital can resist their exploitation through struggle, whereas the Earth suffers utter devastation unless humans intervene.

What Heidegger calls the Ge-Stell (set-up), that stands for endless ‘improvement’ in the will to power over all kinds of movement, intermeshes with the valorization of thingified value in that it enhances valorization through productivity increases, including the acceleration of turnover time of circuits of capital. In this sense, the set-up is a means for the gainful game and its underlying movement of valorization. Valorization plays the lead role, assisted in the supporting role by endless technological ‘progress’. Both the gainful game and the set-up are casts of mind that intermesh and are actual (at work) globally in today’s world. Together they constitute today’s Geist as the consummation of what Hegel regarded as world history. The principle of endless valorization, aided and abetted by the absolute will to power over all kinds of movement, is today’s actuality, its Wirklichkeit, no matter whether the truth of this pernicious global law of movement comes to light of not. That is the task of philosophy today to be ‘activated’ against all odds.

Technological progress presents itself to today’s cast of mind as for the sake of improving the lot of humanity, but in truth it is for the sake of endless valorization. Economic growth is an enigmatic fetish in today’s world, fervently adored by economists, along with most ‘level-headed’ people. Technologies are only developed (through research and investment) and deployed under the condition that they enhance valorization. Mortal humans struggle to gain a share of the thingified value generated by technological progress. This share has the form (eidetic look) of income of various kinds, which mortals, in turn, spend as consumers to fulfil their indispensable role in the gainful game helping circuits of capital to turn over. Despite surface appearances to the contrary, they consume ultimately for the sake of thingified value’s valorization. Consumers are therefore hounded by advertising to consume, whether it contributes to the devastation of the Earth or not.

For Hegel this would be a horrifying vision for the consummation of Geist in world history. Nevertheless it perversely confirms, with the appropriate hermeneutic finesse, that “What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”.

Further reading: Hegel’s Philosophy of Right translated with notes by T.M. Knox, Clarendon Press 1952, O.U.P 1967.

Martin Heidegger ‘Das Ge-Stell’ Bremer Vorträge 1949 in Gesamtausgabe Bd. 79 ed. Petra Jaeger, Klostermann, Frankfurt/M. 1994.

‘Capital and Technology: Marx and Heidegger’ in: Left Curve No. 24 May, Oakland, California pp. 95-128 2000. Third revised and expanded paperback edition CreateSpace, North Charleston 2015.

Kapital und Technik: Marx und Heidegger Verlag J.H. Röll, Dettelbach 117 pp. 2000. Third revised and expanded paperback edition CreateSpace, North Charleston 2015.

‘Capital and Technology: Marx and Heidegger’ (Chinese translation by Li Yanjun, Tianjin) in: German Thought Review (Deyizhi Sixiang Pinglun) Vol. 3, 2007.5, Tongji University Press, Shanghai pp. 37-112.

On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo De Gruyter, Berlin 2024.

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About Michael Eldred

Michael Eldred

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is an Australian philosopher, mathematician, translator & sometime musician residing in Cologne, Germany.

His web site www.arte-fact.org is dedicated to hermeneutic phenomenology with a focus on the questions of (three-dimensional❗) time and various kinds of movement, as well as on the social ontologies of whoness and capitalism.

All entries to this blog are the copyright of Michael Eldred. It continues the artefactphil blog supported by Blogger that ran from February 2012 to the end of 2025.

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