Cologne Theses 	03-Jun-2004 
Michael Eldred 
1	Thinkers are co-casters of world. The historical task: Unfolding the as yet unfolded folds of the first beginning within the open truth of being in the other beginning 
2	Traditional grammar is based on Aristotelean metaphysics. As Heidegger points out in Einführung in die Metaphysik 1935, this metaphysics gives priority to the third person singular in developing its categories and concepts. This implies that to the present day, the first and second persons, and plural number remain a metaphysical problem. 
3	The central Aristotelean pair of concepts, du/namij and e)ne/rgeia, too, are thought first and foremost in the third person singular, i.e. as the relation of an individual entity, a ‘subject’, to a manipulable ‘object’. 
4	Ambiguity of the central Aristotelean concept of metabolh/: ‘change’ AND ‘exchange’. Only the first signification has been unfolded in Western metaphysics. As Aristotle points out, social relations between people involve “at least four terms” (e)n te/ttarsin e)laxi/stoij Eth. Nic. V 1131a19, 32, 1131b10), i.e. a cross-over. 
5	Heidegger does not see this. His unfolding of the ONE fold of metaphysics is premised on the thesis “Sein besagt Hergestelltsein” (MS:26), “Denn der Sinn für Sein ist ursprünglich Hergestelltsein.” (MS:50) (1922), which unfolds into the purported consummation of metaphysics in Gestell, the essence of Technik (18 below). 
6	To retain his one-dimensional vision (“Auf einen Stern zugehen. Nur dieses.”), Heidegger understands and must understand te/xnh exclusively as te/xnh poihtikh/, to the exclusion of those te/xnai that can only be understood METAPHYSICALLY as te/xnai arising in the context of metabolh/ as EXCHANGE: te/xnh oi)konomikh/, te/xnh xrhmatistikh/, te/xnh kthtikh/. 
7	Heidegger counterposes te/xnh poihtikh/ to fu/sij in order to move from the first beginning to the other beginning. The historical task, according to Heidegger, is to ground the as yet ungrounded fu/sij of the first beginning by stepping back to the open timespace of a)lh/qeia. He proposes an “Ortsverlegung” (Zähringen, 07-Sep-1973), a “shift of site”. 
8	But the step back to a)lh/qeia leaves the folds of the second person and plural number still unfolded, i.e. the questions of I-and-you, of I-and-we demand NOT ONLY the step back, but ALSO the twisting into the dimension of other human beings as such. 
9	The question of I-and-you is the metaphysical-dialogical problem of encounter in the interstitial between. In this, the phenomenon of timh/ (esteem, estimation, honour, public office, reputation, vocation, social standing, social status) that permeates both Plato’s and Aristotle’s texts and the Greek world through and through, finally has to be brought to its ontological concept. 
10	Bringing the multifaceted concept of timh/ to its ontological concept amounts to thinking the as yet metaphysically unthought phenomenality of WHONESS, Wersein. One privative mode of timh/ that deserves special attention is flattery (kolakei/a), which permeates especially Plato’s thinking. 
10a	Hegel’s Dialektik der Anerkennung in the Phänomenologie des Geistes is one grand attempt to think through the constitution of the self through mirroring in the other from within the metaphysics of subjectivity. 
11	The question of I-and-we is the metaphysical question par excellence concerning the ontological constitution of the socio-political dimension. 
11a	Hegel’s concept of Geist can be regarded as one grand attempt in the history of Western philosophy to think the constitiution of an historical We, albeit from within the subjectivist metaphysics of the modern age. 
12	Heidegger’s claim that metaphysics finds its historical consummation in Nietzsche’s thinking goes hand in hand with the characterization of our historical situation as nihilism understood as the devaluation of the highest values. But Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s concept of value is thought in the third person, i.e. as the relation between Mensch und Welt. The German concept of Mensch, to be sure, is understood as a universal We, but this We is in truth merely a generalized, universalized I whose ontological constitution remains unthought. The values posited by the Mensch are thus universal, generalized values, not values that come about interactively through EXCHANGE between and among people understood in the genuine plural who practically share a world. 
13	Heidegger neglects to take up and critically engage with value as it is thought through by Hegel who, in turn, in his Rechtsphilosophie, develops a concept of value in the Auseinandersetzung with Adam Smith and Ricardo. Value (of goods, both material and personal - esteem) arises in the interchange of reciprocal estimation. 
14	Heidegger subsumes Marx entirely under Hegel and regards him, Marx, solely from the thesis “Sein besagt Hergestelltsein”. Thus, Heidegger claims: “Für Marx ist das Sein Produktionsprozeß.” (Le Thor, 07-Sep-1969). But Marx is the thinker of the constitution of commodity value through exchange and the phenomenon of exchange differs METAPHYSICALLY from production in its ontological structure. 
15	In his famous Wertformanalyse in the first chapter of Das Kapital, Marx cites precisely Aristotle’s thinking on the exchange of goods and the constitution of money from the FIFTH book of the Nicomachean Ethics on dikaiosu/nh, Justice. For Aristotle, justice is a phenomenon arising within practical intercourse with others, i.e. pro\j e(/teron. In other words, it is an eminently SOCIAL phenomenon. But for Heidegger, it is the SIXTH book of the Nicomachean Ethics that is centrally important. He never provides a thorough Auseinandersetzung with the fifth book. Indeed, he leaves it unmentioned even when considering phenomena such as Gerechtigkeit, di/kh. 
16	Because Heidegger thinks power, Macht exclusively from within his thesis, “Sein besagt Hergestelltsein”, he is unable to think SOCIAL power, whose ontological structure involves a cross-over of “at least four terms”. 
17	Because Heidegger subsumes all phenomena one-dimensionally underneath his thesis, “Sein besagt Hergestelltsein”, he must also subsume the phenomenality of modern capitalist economy to his thinking on Technik. Capital is then only an aspect of Gestell and thus belongs to the “fore-seeing precalculability” of beings in their totality. Heidegger is thus unable to think MONEY as a SOCIAL thing. The realms of economy, society, politics, as realms based on EXCHANGE (of views, goods, recognition, esteem, compliments, insults, etc.), are essentially incalculable. Technik and Kommerz have essentially different ontological structures. 
18	Thus, not the onefold of Gestell, but the THREEFOLD of Gewer – Gewinnst – Gestell characterizes our present-day constellation of phallic-gainful-enframing being. GEWER: the gathering of possibilities of standing as somewho. GEWINNST: the gathering of possibilities of gain through social intercourse. GESTELL: the gathering of possibilities of setting-up.